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by demurrer (Leggate v. .Moulton, 115 Mass. 552), or by plea in
abatement, or the death may be taken advantage of at the trial
without a plea: Baltimore, fe., Bilroad Co. v. -Ritchie, 31 Md.
191. An answer by a defendant, setting up that he is dead, is
inconsistent, for the fact that he has put in an answer proves that
he is alive; such an answer therefore is bad on demurrer: -Freeman
v. Frank, 10 Abb. Pr. 370.
JoHN D. LAWSON.
St. Louis, Mo.
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DECISIONS.

Supreme Court of Illinois.
BARCLAY v. SMITH.
A certificate of membership in a corporation formed for the purpose of maintaining a commercial exchange, and from which the member derives no pecuniary profit,
but only the advantage resulting from the right to transact business in its rooms, is
not property which is liable to be subjected by creditor's bill to the payment of the
member's debts.
A creditor's bill was filed to subject a certificate of membership in the Chicago
Board of Trade to the member's debts and to restrain him from transferring it. It
appeared that the certificate was transferable to any person eligible to membership
who might be approved by the directors and that it had a market value of $4000,
but that it did not entitle the member to any pecuniary profit or dividend, but only
to tlfe commercial advantage resulting from his position and privileges as a member
of the corporation: Held (reversing the judgment of the court below, reported 21
Am. Law Reg. 408), that the bill could not be sustained.

from the First District.
This was a creditor's bill, filed in the Supreme Court of Cook
county, against the debtor and the Board of Trade of Chicago for
discovery as to the nature and value of the debtor's certificate of
membership in the board, and for an injunction to restrain the
transfer of such certificate. That court sustained the bill and
entered a decree requiring the debtor to execute an assignment
of the certificate to a receiver, and enjoining him from otherwise
disposing of it. The opinion is fully reported in 21 Am. Law
Reg. 408. This decree was affirmed by the appellate court of the
First District, whereupon the present appeal was taken.
APPEAL

The opinion of the court was delivered by
CRAIG, J.-There is but one question presented by the record
and that is whether a certificate of membership in the Board of
Trade of the City of Chicago is property which is liable to be sub-
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jected to the payment of the debts of the holder by legal proceedings. The Board of Trade of Chicago is a corporation created by
a special act of the legislature of the state, with power to sue and
be.sued, to purchase and hold property not to exceed at any time
$200,000. The objects of the corporation, as declared by the
charter and by-laws, are "to maintain a commercial exchange; to
promote uniformity in the customs and usages of merchants ; to
inculcate principles of justice and equity in trade ; to facilitate the
speedy adjustment of business disputes; to acquire and to disseminate valuable commercial and economic information; and generally,
to secure to its members the benefits of co-operation in the furtherance of their legitimate pursuits."
By the twelfth section of the charter the corporation is prohibited
from transacting any business excepting such as is usual in the
management of boards of trade or chambers of commerce. No
dividends whatever are made among the members of the corporation.
No person can become a member unless he receives the votes of
not less than ten of the board of directors. A certificate of membership is transferable in the books of the association to any person
eligible to membership who may be approved by the board of
directors after due notice. The corporation has power to make
by-laws for the management of its business and the mode in which
it shall be transacted. Under the by-laws the board of directors
are required to provide necessary rooms and offices for the purposes
of the association, which shall be kept open on all business days
during certain hours for the admission of the members.
From an examination of the charter and by-laws of the corporation it is apparent that no member receives any pecuniary profit
from the corporation or from its capital or revenue except such
advantage in the way of trade as he may derive from the mere
privilege of being a member and from being admitted to transact
business in the rooms of the board. If dividends were authorized
to be declared among the members as stockholders, of the earnings
or accumulations of money or property, there might be some ground
for holding that a certificate of membership was property and liable
to be taken for the debts of the members, but such is not the case.
However much money or property may be accumulated by the
board it is powerless to declare a dividend among its members.
When the" nature and object of a certificate of membership is
understood, can it upon any reasonable principle be said to be
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property ? In Bouvier's Law Dictionary the author, under the
head of "Property," gives a definition as follows: "The right and
interest which a man has in lands and chattels to the exclusion of
others." The author also announces the rule that "property considered as an exclusive right to things contains not only the
right to use those things, but a right to dispose of them as
the owner may desire." The certificate of membership is neither
lands nor chattels, nor can a member dispose of his membership
as he pleases. A sale can only be made to such person as the
board, through its directors, may determine. If then, a certificate
of membership is property, it does not fall within the definition
given, nor do we know of any definition of property within
which it would fall. It may be said that a certificate of membership has a large value and hence ought to be regarded as
property. It is true that the board requires a person who becomes
a member to pay an initiation fee of $5000, and the evidence shows
that a certificate of membership is regarded in the market as worth
$4000, but this does not change the character of the right. A
church organized under our statute may own property for the uses
and privileges of its members worth as much as the property possessed by the Board of Trade, and the right of a member to attend
the meetings of the church and occupy a pew may be regarded as
a high and valuable right, and yet the right of membership has
never been regarded as property which may be subjected to the
payment of the debts of a member. The same may be also said
in regard to the membership in a Masonic lodge or a social club,
and various other organizations of a similar character. There may
be, and doubtless are, many privileges which a man may possess
that are valuable to him which do not fall within the definition of
property and which may be enjoyed but cannot be subjected to the
payment of debts. A liquor dealer may be licensed to sell liquors
at a oertain place for a certain time, for which privilege he is
required to pay $1000 per annum. That privilege is worth to him
much more than he is required to pay. But is that privilege property which may be sold on execution or reached by a creditor's
bill for the payment of debts ? We have never so understood the
law. A peddler or an auctioneer may be licensed to carry on his
vocation within a certain district, for which they may pay a stipulated sum of money, the profits arising from the privilege of
exercising the right may be much larger than can be earned by a
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person exercising the right to transact business on the floor of the
Board of Trade, and yet we have never understood that such a
privilege was liable to be seized and sold in satisfaction of debts.
The attorney and physician are licensed to practice their professions; it costs money to obtain such a privilege; it may be, and is
a valuable right, and yet such a right can not be taken by a creditor's
bill and sold in satisfaction of a debt. The same may be said in
regard to various other privileges which may be and often are conferred upon persons in the different pursuits of life.
A certificate of membership in the Board of Trade of Chicago
empowers the person who is admitted as a member to attend the
meetings of the board and deal in the various products of the
country.
This right to appear at a certain place'and transact certain business, in our judgment, is not property, but it is a mere privilege
conferred upon the member which cannot be reached and sold by the
process of courts. It is a right which may be regarded as valuable,
but which can not be diverted or destroyed except. by the board
itself for a failure of the member to conform to the rules and
regulations of the association. This view is in harmony with the
rule announced by the Supreme Court of the state of Pennsylvania
where a similar question arose: Thompson v. Adams, 93 Penn.
St. 55; Pancoast v. Gowen, Id. 66.
We have been referred to some cases which seemed to hold a
different view, but without entering upon a review of the cases cited,
we do not think they establish the correct rule and we are not
inclined to follow them.
The judgment of the Appellate Court will be reversed and the
cause remanded.
Reversed and remanded.
We took occasion when the principal
case was decided in the Superior Court
of Cook county, Illinois, to comment
upon that decision (21 Am. Law
Reg. 413); and, though coming to
the examination of the case with the
opinion that the decision was erroneous,
a careful examination of the opinion
then rendered, and of the authorities
therein cited, as well as the others referred
to in our note, convinced us that our
previous opinion was incorrect, and that

the learned judge who first decided the
case was right; and of this opinion was
the intermediate Appellate Court. An
attentive perusal of the opinion in the
principal case has not changed our
views.
The only cases deciding the exact
point involved in Barclay v. Smith, that
have come to our notice since the note
above referred to was written, are In re
WIerder, 15 red. Rep. 789, decided by
the United States Circuit Court of New
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on page 15 of Book II., lie says that "the
objects of dominion or property axe
things, as contradistinguished from persons, and things are by the law of Bngland, distributed into two kinds: things
real and things personal."
In Jacob's Law Dictionary we find
property defined as: " the highest right a
man can have to anything; being used
for that right which one bath to lands or
tenements, goods or chattels, which no
way depend on another man's curtesy."
This definition was adopted in Stiel v.
Hart, I N. Y. 24.
In Rutherford's Institutes, p. 20, the
right of property is defined as follows:
"Our right to things is either such an
one as is common to us with all mankind,
or such an one as is peculiar to ourselves.
Some things belong to us, because they
belong to the species in general, and to
us among the rest. Other things belong to
us by such a right as excludes all the rest
of the species from having anything at
The right by virtue of which a
all to do with them. Such an exclusive
thing belongs to one or is one's own ; right to things is called property. 'Where
things are thus fully our own, or where
ownership ; dominion ; the unrestricted
all others are excluded from meddling
and exclusive right to a thing ; the right
with them, or from interfering in any
to dispose of the substance of a thing in
every legal way; to possess it, to use it,
manner about them, it is plain that no
and to exclude every one else from interperson, besides the proprietor, who has
this exclusive right, can have any claim
fering with it. The exclusive right of
using and disposing of a subject as one's
either to use them, or to hinder him from
own." This definition is adopted by
disposing of them as he pleases. So that
property, considered as an exclusive right
Mir. Worcester.
to things, contains not only a right
Mr. Bouvier defines property as "the
right and interest which a man has in to use those things, but a right to dispose of them either by exchanging them
lands and chattels, to the exclusion of
for other things or by giving them away
others."
Blackstone says that the right of proto any other person without any valuable
perty "consists of the free use, enjoyment
consideration in return, or even o? throwand disposal of all his acquisitions, withing them away, which is usually called
out any control or diminution, save only relinquishing them."
Mr. Austin, in his Lectures on Juris1 Bl. Com.
by the laws of the land."
prudence, /sect. 515, defines ownership
138. Again, he defines it as "that sole
or property as "the right to use or deal
and despotic dominion which one man
with some given subject in a manner or
claims and exercises over the external
to an extent whieh, though notunlimited,
things of the world, in total exclusion
is indefinite."
of the right of any other individual in
Definitions substantially the same as
the universe :" Book II., p. 2. Again
Jersey, March 28th 1883; and Powell v.
I1aldron, 89 N. Y. 328, in both of which
a conclusion opposite to that of the principal case is arrived at. The point involved is of sufficient importance to
warrant further consideration, and without going over the ground covered by
our previous note upon this ease, it will
perhaps be profitable to endeavor to get
a clearer idea of what is the legal definition of property.
Mr. Webster defines property as "the
exclusive right of possessing, enjoying
and disposing of a thing; ownership."
Mr. Burrill thus defines it: ''That
which is proper or peculiar to one ; that
which belongs to one ; that which is one's
own; that to which one has an unrestricted and exclusive right, including
all that is one's own, whether corporeal
or incorporeal. Property in this sense
denotes the things themselves which are
the subjects of right, as in the expressions
real property,' ' personal property.'
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those above quoted have been adopted in
Jones v. Vanzandt, 4 McLean C. C. 603;
Wynehainer v. People, 13 N. Y. 397
Ayers v. Lawrence, 59 Id. 198 ; Dow v.
Gould, 31 Cal. 637; Toledo Bank v.
Bond, 1 Ohio St. 662 ; Dorman v. State,
34 Ala. 239 ; Stevens v. State, 2 Ark.
299; Bruch v. Carter, 32 N. J. Law
561; Law of Burial, 4 Bradf. Sur. 516.
Authorities giving substantially the
same definition of the right of property,
might easily be multiplied, but the cases
and authors above cited will suffice.
From the above-quoted definitions, it
will be apparent that the term property,
although frequently applied to the thing
owned, in strictness means only the
rights of the owner in relation to it. See
Dorman v. State, supra. This doctrine
was well stated by Mun.Y, J., in delivering the opinion of the court in Rigney v. Chicago, 102 Il1. 64, 77: "1Property, in its appropriate sense, means
that dominion or indefinite right of user
and disposition which one may lawfully
exercise over particular things or subjects, and generally to the exclusion of
all others ; * * * yet the term is often
used to indicate the res or subject of
the property, rather than the property
itself."
With respect to the objects of this
right the authorities are not so clear.
Blackstone, in the quotation made above,
says, that the objects of dominion or property are things as contradistinguished
from persons, and that things are distributed into two kinds, things real and
things personal. With respect to most
things claimed as the objects of the exercise of-this right of property, there can
be no doubt. With the continued advance in the arts and sciences, and in the
jefinements and subtleties of civilization,
the limits of the class of things constituting the objects of property must conA few cases may
tinually enlarge.
profitably be examined in this connection.
In Caro v. Railroad Co., 19 Am. Law
Reg. (N. S.) 384, SPEWi, J., referring

to the taking of property for the public
h
use, said: "T e term ' property' is of
the largest import and embraces every
mode in which it may be applied to public use, and extends to every species of
valuable right and interest, and includes
real and personal property, easements,
franchises and incorporeal hcreditaments."
In People v. Cadman, 57 Cal. 562, it
was held that the right to take and prosecute an appeal is property within the
meaning of sect. 519 of the Penal Code;
and that a threat made for the purpose
of inducing an appellant to dismiss an
appeal is a threat made with intent to
extort property from another.
In Carlton v. Carlton, 72 Me. 116,
WALrox, J., justly observed that the

word "property" in its broadest sense
includes everything which goes to make
up one's wealth or estate.
In the Matter of the 'widening of Beekmaw Street, 4 Bradf. Sur. 503, it was
considered that the right to the mere repose of a grave, although intangible or
invisible, was quasi property.
The cases cited in the note to Smith v.
Barclay, 21 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.)
408, et seq., may be profitably read in
this connection. The cases of Pancoast
v. Gowen, and Thompson v. Adams, cited
by the court in the principal case, will
there be found commented upon and
distinguished. It is unnecessary here
to repeat what was there said upon this
subject.
Let us now examine the definition of
the term "privilege" :
"Privilege is either personal or real:
a personal privilege is that which is
granted to any person, either against or
beside the course of the common law.
A privilege real is that which is granted
to a place." Cowell's Interpreter.
-,
ivilegium est beneficium persnale, et
extinguitur crm persona. A privilege is
a personal benefit, and is extinguished
with the person: Rex v. Hanger, 3
Bulst. 8.
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fackeldy, sects. 188, 189, defines
privileyium as every privilege granted by
law in derogation of common right.
Mr. Burrill, in his Law Dictionary,
thus defines " privilege :" "An exemption or imnanity from some general duty
or burden ; a right peculiar to some individual or body. According to its etymology-a law, or provision or exception of law in favor of an individual
(quasipriva, orprivata lex) ; a peculiar
right or favor granted by law, contrary
to the common rule."
With reference to privilege, Mr. Bouvier, in his Law Dictionary, says : " This
word, taken in its active sense, is a particular law or a particular disposition
of the law, which grants certain special
prerogatives to some persons, contrary
to common right. In its passive sense,
it is the same prerogative granted by
the same particular law."
The term "privilege" includes, in its
ordinary definition an exemption from
such burthens as others are subjected to,
as the privilege of being exempt from
arrest, or from taxation: State v. Betts,
24 N. J. L. 557.
The word "privilege" may be defined
as a right peculiar to an individual or
body: Ripley v. rKnight, 123 Mass. 519.
This case arose under a statute granting
the "privilege of the shores."
A privilege is a right or franchise created by legislative grant that cannot be
exercised by any citizen without some
statutory provision conferring upon some
one or more individuals the right of
doing some particular thing: Languille
v. The State, 4 Tex. App. 317.
A privilege is a right or immunity by
way of exemption from the general law:
Louisville, 4-c., Railroad Co. v. Gaines,
3 Fed. Rep. 278.
In Mayor, 6-c., v. Guest, 3 Head.
414, in construing a constitutional provision authorizing the taxation of merchants, peddlers and privileges, privilege
was thus defined: "The exercise of an
occupation or business, which requires a
VoL. XXXI.-56

license from some proper authority, designated by general law, and not open to
all or any one, without such license." See
also, Lawyers' Tax Cases, 8 Heisk. 649.
With reference to the opinion in the
principal case, it may be observed that
the facts of the case are not stated by the
court so fully as a good understanding of
the case would seem to require; and
reference is made to the report of the
case on page 408 of vol. 21, N. S., of
this journal, for a more satisfactory
statement, where the rules of the Board
of Trade and the form of certificates of
membership and assignments thereof are
given in full.
With reference to the fact that no
dividends are made to the members,
,which seems to have had considerable
weight with the court, we are unable to
understand how that fact has any controlling influence upon the case. Although dividends are the object usually
aimed at in the organization of corporations, we can easily understand how
shares of stock on which no money dividends are payable or even contemplated
might from a variety of other reasons be
very desirable and of a high pecuniary
value, and we know of no case making
the payment of dividends necessary, in
order that such share of stock should be
considered property. The shares of stock
issued by the Chicago Law Institute, to
its members, afford a familiar example
of stock on which no dividends are payable, and notwithstanding no dividends
are ever payable, we do not think any
one will claim that such shares are not
property. The certificate" of membership in the Chicago Board of Trade
is really a certificate of stock, though
called by another name, and the fact
that no dividends are contemplated ought
not to be conclusive upon the question.
With reference to the definition of property, quoted by the court, as well as
most of the other definitions herein quoted,
while it is true that ordinarily the right
of property involves not only an exclu-
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sive right, but also the right of disposition as the owner may desire, there are
many sorts of property clogged with
conditions and limitations which prevent
its disposition in accordance with the
desire of the owner. The case of estates
tail before Taltarum's Case is a familiar
example, and it would be easy to multiply examples. In this case there is a
modified power of disposal sufficient to
bring the case within a correct definition ;
and the right of each member is certainly
absolutely exclusive so long as he retains
his membership.
The statement that the membership is
neither lands nor chattels, begs the entire
question. It would be equally argumentative to allege that it is personal property.
The illustrations given by the court of
church memberships, memberships in
masonic lodges, &c., are not relevant to

the question under discussion, inasmuch
as they are never transferable and have
no market value.
The memberships in question are
transferable and have a market value.
The membership in question is not a
mere privilege, because it is not only
transferable, but is not absolutely terminated by the death of the member,
it being expressly provided by the rules
of the board that the membership of
a deceased member shall be transferred by his legal representative. A
mere privilege is a personal benefit and
is extinguished with the person: Rex v.
Hanger, 3 Bulst. 8.
All things considered the decision in
the principal case is eminently unsatisfactory, and in our judgment has no solid
foundation either in reason or authority.
IntmsnL D. Ewnrs..

Chicago.

Court of Appeals of the State of Kentucky.
COMMONWEALTH v. WHIPS.
An act authorizing an individual to dispose of his property bfylottery, notwithstanding a general statute prohibiting, under penalty, the holding of such a lottery,
is not a violation of the provision of the Bill of Rights that no man is entitled to
exclusive public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services.
The word "privilege" in the Bill of Rights means a public privilege and not a
mere privilege for the exercise of a private right, and, therefore, a grant to a person
of a special privilege, with reference to his own property, and which works no injury
to others, is not unconstitutional.

APPEAL from the Jefferson county Circuit Court.

This was an appeal from a judgment dismissing an indictment
by which the defendant was charged with promoting a lottery in
violation of a general law of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. The

facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.
P. W. Hfardin, Attorney-General, for appellant.

I. " J. Caldwell & Winston and B. F. Camp, for appellee.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
J.-The appellee, W. C. D. Whips, was indicted by a
grand jury impanelled in the Jefferson Circuit Court, of the offence
of promoting a lottery by permitting a building occupied and owned
by him to be used for the sale of lottery tickets for the disposal of
money and property by way of lottery, and by advertising a lottery,
known as the Willard Hotel Lottery, by which it was proposed to
dispose of certain property (described) by lottery. No objection
was made to the indictment, and the defendant by his plea traversed
the charges made against him and by an agreement between the
attorney for the state and the accused the law and facts -were submitted to the court for judgment. On the hearing the appellee
relied on an act of the legislature, approved the 27th of April, in
the year 1880, as vesting him with authority to sell certain property,
of which he was the owner, by lottery. Section one of that act
provides "that it may be lawful for W. C. D. Whips, of Louisville,
Jefferson county, Kentucky, to dispose of the Willard Hotel property, situated on Jefferson street, in the city of Louisville, Kentucky, with two houses and lots on -Green street, in the rear of the
Willard Hotel, etc., and for that purpose may issue and sell by his
agents as many certificates of specified undivided interests therein
at prices which will in the aggregate amount to the fair equitable
value of the property and the costs of disposing of the same in the
manner hereby authorized.
"Sec. 2. That Robert Mallory, L. M. Flournoy, H. Clay, H. P.
Whittaker and G. H. Winston, be and they are hereby appointed
commissioners, any three of whom may act, whose duty it shall be
to determine by lot, as may be mientioned in said certificate, to what
shareholder or shareholders any portion or portions of said property
shall belong, and to whom the title thereunto shall be made, and to
do and perform all such acts as in their opinion may be necessary
to carry this act into full effect, and shall invest the funds arising
from said certificates in the payment of the just creditors of the
said Whips.
"Sect. 3. This act is intended to apply to the property described
herein and to no other, and when said property is sold said grant
shall cease and be of no effect; provided, that there shall in no
event be but one distribution or drawing under this act," etc. By
reason of this act the appellee claims the right to dispose of his
PRYOR,

-
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property by way of lottery, and to appropriate the proceeds to the
payment of his creditors.
The court below adjudged in his favor by dismissing the indictment, and the Commonwealth is in this court asking a reversal.
The attorney for the state maintains that the act in question is in
violation of section one of the Bill of Rights. The section reads:
"That all freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal,
and that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate
public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services."
The proper construction or true meaning of the Bill of Rights
is the issue presented, and we are aware of no case decided by
this court where the question has been duly considered, if at all;
and certainly no case analogous to the one under consideration.
Without discussing the grammatical construction of the language
used in the section, it is plain, we think, that this constitutional
inhibition was intended to prevent the exercise of some public
function or an exclusive privilege affecting the interests and rights
of the public generally when not in consideration of public service,
and if made to-apply to the exercise of mere private rights or
special privileges it nullifies almost innumerable legislative enactments that are to be found in our private statutes, sanctioned in
many instances by every department of the state government. It
is our boast, as is urged by counsel for the state, "that under our
government none are entitled to exclusive rights, but that all are
governed by equal laws, subject to like burdens and entitled to
equal privileges, having one rule for rich and poor, for favorite at
court and countryman at the plough," but this doctrine of equality
or maxim of constitutional law does not mean that every man must
be permitted to exercise" the same special or private privileges.
Special privileges may be granted to one or more citizens when the
rights of others are not affected by it. We have general laws
enacted for the protection of life, person and property, with the
right-to acquire and use our property and its accumulations as we
see proper, subject to these general laws and when not interfering
with the rights of others. The citizen has the right to demand
that he shall be governed and protected by these general laws, and
when excluded from such protection it is in plain violation of his
constitutional rights. An absolute equality of private right in the
exercise of special privileges, if ever possible, is not practicable
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under our form of government in the light this case has been
presented by counsel for the state. Special privileges must be
granted as a matter of necessity, originating, not only by reason
of our form of government, but from the general laws enacted for
the protection of person and property. General laws can not
always be applied to individual necessities, and particularly with
reference to the right of property, and when a special privilege is
granted with reference to one's own property, and without injury
to others, we perceive no objection to it. If the legislature should
be denied the right by an amendment to the Constitution to legislate
with reference to local or private interests, the sovereign (the people) would confer this right on local tribunals vested with similar
powers. What interest has H. in the sale and transfer of the property of B. if it in no manner affects his private rights ? and,
while under the general law the right of each to sell and convey
their property in the same manner can not be denied, if B. by
special enactment is empowered to sell and transfer his land in a
different way, we can not well perceive how this affects the constitutional rights of A. It is insisted, notwithstanding the existence
of the general law that the special privilege is unconstitutional
because every citizen is not authorized to sell in the same mode,
that it is a legislative invasion of the rights of equality, and for
that reason within the constitutional inhibition. Conceding for
the purposes of this case that this section of the constitution
applies to the exercise of a mere private right or special privilege
where is to be found any word of exclusion in the gran't of the
right to sell the house of the appellee by lottery, or the land of 2.
by parol, and what is to prevent the legislature from granting a
like exclusive privilege to any citizen upon making the application?
But the word privilege in the meaning of the constitution is a
pubIic privilege and not the exercise or enjoyment of a special
privilege. When the citizen undertakes to discharge a duty to
the public that the state is under an obligation to discharge, and in
consideration for the undertaking an exclusive privilege is granted,
the grant is constitutional because in consideration of public service. The exclusive right to keep a ferry, to construct and operate
highways, to improve and navigate rivers, all such exclusive rights
are based upon a consideration rendered by the public in the discharge
of a duty the state was required to perform; it becomes a binding
contract and can not be violated by either the state or the citizen,
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nor can it be repealed unless that right is reserved in the grant or
by reason of some general law, and until the repeal it has all the
essential elements of a contract, and the rights of the parties under
it can not be disturbed. A mere privilege granted by the legislature for the exercise of a private right is always subject to legislative repeal, and while rights of property acquired by reason of
such special privileges cannot be divested, the right of repeal
exists until such rights are acquired under it and even after, except
in so far as it may be necessary to protect or preserve the property
rights already acquired. This constitutes the principal distinction
between grants in consideration of public service and mere privileges
for the advancement of private interests. The cases cited by
counsel bear but little analogy to the case before us. In the case
of Holden v. James, 11 Mass. 396, an attempt by the legislature
was made to suspend the Statute of iLimitations in a particular case,
so as to take it out of the operation of the general law. The case
of L-ewis v. Webb, 3 Greenleaf 326, was where an appeal was
allowed by the legislature in a particular case, regardless of the
general law, and in Durkee v. Janesville, 28 Wis. 464, the city
of Janesville was exempted from costs in a proceeding against it
by Durkee. This legislation was plainly in violation of the
individual rights of others and a disregard of the great principle
of constitutional equality so earnestly contended for by counsel,
although the decision in each case was based mainly on the ground
that the legislature was attempting to prescribe to courts of justice
the character of judgments to be rendered, and that this was an exercise of judicial power by the legislature in violation of the plain
provisions of the Constitution. In the case of Holden v. James,
reported in 11 Mass. 396, already referred to, the general limitation
law had been suspended for the benefit of one party, so that he might
sue and his adversary be prevented from pleading the statute. In the
discussion of that case it was said that "the act was contrary to
natural justice and to the spirit of the constitution and laws of the
state by giving to one citizen privileges and advantages denied to
others;" and so in all the cases where private rights are invaded
or jeopardized by legislative enactment, the granting of a privilege
to one, by way of exemption from the operation of a general law,
is denounced by the courts as subversive of the rule of constitutional equality, and in the discussion of this class of cases is to be
found the language used by the courts, that is now offered as
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authority for holding the act before us unconstitutional. Suppose
the state with reference to its own claim against the citizens should
have suspended the Statute of Limitation, or after judgment had
authorized an appeal when, at the time the judgment was rendered,
the law did not warrant such a proceeding, can it be maintained
that such legislation would be unconstitutional ? No right has been
interfered with in such a case except that of the state, and the
sovereign power may not only grant the appeal, but release the
debtor from his contract: Calkins v. The State, 21 Wis. 501 ;
-Peoplev. Prisbie, 26 Cal. 135. "IPrivileges (says Cooley in his
work on Constitutional Limitations) may be granted to particular
individuals, when by doing so the rights of others are not interfered
with ;" and we can see no constitutional objection to the exercise
of such legislative power. It is a mere question of policy to be
determined by the legislator and not the judge. This character
of legislation has been indulged in since the formation of the state
constitution, and has met the approval of every department of the
state government, and it is now too late to question the exercise of
such a power. The right to sue the state may by speial legislation
be given to one and at the same time withheld from another, by reason of the general law. It is said, however, that this is expressly
authorized by the sixth section of art. 8 of the Constitution, that
provides, "the General Assembly may direct by law in what manner and in what courts suits may be brought against the CommonThis provision does not authorize a violation of the
wealth."
doctrine of equality under the law, and a permission to one to sue
the state without the same privilege given to all others, is in violation of the fundamental law if we adopt the theory presented by
counsel for the Commonwealth. Suit after suit is permitted to be
instituted against the state by the individual citizen, and when not
affecting the rights of others there can be no objection to it. The
legislature may, and often dbes, authorize one under the age of
twenty-one years to exercise all the rights of an adult with reference to his estate and business affairs; still if the view of counsel
prevail all such acts are unconstitutional, because the same right is
not granted to every citizen who is not an adult. The charter of
every private corporation in which the public can have no interest,
except such as may arise by reason of business relations with them,
contains grants of privileges that do not belong to an individual or
to similar corporations. Such rights are not exclusive, whether
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granted to a-corporation or to an individual ; they are exceptional
privileges merely, and operate only in the mind of the legislator in
advancing the private interests of the party obtaining the grant,
without affecting the rights of others, and such legislation is not open
to constitutional objection. The exclusive right to trade in a particular locality, or to purchase and sell the products of the farms in a
particular county, is not only in violation of the Constitution, but
was illegal and void at the common law. Monopolies are odious,
and exclusive rights such as those mentioned cannot be granted.
The Slaughter-House cases, with dissenting opinions, reported in 16
Wall., would have been so held but for the position assumed that
the act was a police regulation necessary for the health and comfort
of the people:
In the case of aordon v. Winchester Building Association, 12
Bush 110, where the corporation had been: authorized to loan
money at, ten per cent. interest, that court held, in an action to
recover the money, that the act authorizing a loan for interest
exceeding that .permitted to be charged by the general law was
unconstitutional, and in the decision of the case regarded it is an
exclusive :right conferred on the association that brought it within
the constitutional inhibition. Whether the reasoning in that case
is sound is not material to inquire in this case, as the court differs
upon the question as it had heretofore differed upon a similar
question brought up from the Louisville Chancery Court. In the
case of Gordon the money was loaned at ten per cent. interest, and
a premium of $66 required to be paid for the privilege of borrowing,
and the case might well have been brought within the rule with
reference to such associations upon the question of usury as settled
by this 'court in Herbert v. The Kenton Building Association,
reported in 11 Bush 296. Besidesi G6rdon was complaining in that
case, and this court had at least a party before it who claimed that
his constitutional rights would be violated by requiring him to pay
this usury to the corporation.
Lottery grants are now. in existence in this state, and their
constitutionality has never been denied, nor can the theory of counsel be maintained that their validity is upheld by reason of or in
consideration of public service. There is no more obligation on
the state through the legislature to maintain a public school at
Frankfort than there is to pay the debts of appellee, and if so why
grant a lottery privilege to the one college and deny the right to a
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like college located in a different locality. It is conferring a privilege on one and withholding it from the other. These are in fact
mere special privileges acquired under legislative grant for the
advancement of private or local interests that in no manner violates
the rights of others, and neither grant can be said to have been
made in consideration of public service.
The motive prompting the legislature to make the grant cannot
be inquired into by this court. " Plenary power in the legislature
for all purposes of civil government is the rule" with uncontrolled
authority in making the laws within the limits of the constitution.
This court has nothing to do with the moral question involved. If
it had, the case could be easily disposed of. " The legislative
makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary construes the law."
Cooley's Constitutional Limitations.
As 'anadditional argument in favor of the constitutionility of the
measure is the practical construction placed upon this section of the
Bill of Rights by the constant legislation of the state conferring
special privileges since. the formation of the state constitution.
"When such is the case," says Cooley, "a strong presumption
exists that the construction rightly interprets the intention," and
besides, says the same author, where the question of construction,
after all the investigation given the subject, remains a matter of
doubt it is clear that the court should abstain from deciding it
unconstitutional.
The appellee, Whips, was involved in debt, and -the legislature,
upon his application, granted him the privilege of selling his property by lottery, at a single drawing, the proceeds to be applied to
the payment of his indebtedness. The extent of the grant and the
power conferred by it are not questioned. The Commonwealth,
after making the grant, has indicted him from proceeding to act
under it, and is insisting that he shall be fined in a sum not exceeding $10,000 for promoting a lottery. No other party is complaining,
and the citizen, by reason of the grant, deprived of no right he
had when the grant was made. Can this penalty be enforced, and
is the act unconstitutional? Both questions must be answered in
the negative, and the judgment below is therefore affirmed.
Judges HARGIS and

HINES

dissenting.

A general law of the state of Kentucky
forbad the sale of lottery tickts, and
punished those who engaged in holding a
VOL. XXX .- 57

lottery. In the face of this general law
the legislature authorized Whips to dispose of his property by lottery. What
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were the motives that induced the legislature to grant this special privilege ddes
not appear from the opinion, unless it
was to enable him to pay his debts.
That clause of the Constitution forbidding the granting of special privileges,
it is said, "was intended to prevent the
exercise of some public function or an
exclusive privilege affecting the interests
and rights of the public generally, when
not in consideration of public service."
If such is not the construction to be
placed upon that clause, then the people
would confer upon local tribunals power
to legislate with reference to local or
private interests. When it is necessary
to surmise what the sovereign people
would do were a certain construction
placed upon a provision of the Constitution, in order to support the constitutionality of a statute, we certainly are compelled to receive the opinion of the court
resorting to such reasoning and methods
with much hesitancy. And were it in
any other state, where lotteries are not
tolerated, the decision in a similar case
would certainly have been very different.
Certainly the reasoning of the opinion is
very strained, and while it is the duty
of the courts to uphold all legislative
enactments, and in case of doubt to
yield to the legislative construction of the
Constitution, yet here certainly was an
opportunity for the exercise of that independence of thought and action
which the courts have always been free
to exercise, and, when the opportunity
afforded, to decide, without fear of criticism.
No question of police power arises as
in the Slaughter-HouseCases; that is out
of the question. The statute was applicable to no class of individuals, but was
confined to one individual. Perhaps be
alone would be estopped to deny its
validity, either from having petitioned
the legislature for its passage, or else from
having accepted its provisions after its
passage : Ferguson v. Landram, 5 Bush
230; MAotz v. Detroit, 18 Mich. 495 ;

Beall v. Beall, 8 Ga. 210. Neither is lie
selected by the legislature and subjected
to any peculiar rules, or any special
obligations or burdens imposed upon
him, nor is it enacted that he shall dispose
of his property in any certain way, buthe
is left free and untrammelled to accept or
reject the provisions of the statute. Such
an act would be unconstitutional: Lin
Sing v. Washburn, 20 Cal. 534. In Holden
v. James, 11 Mass. 396, cited in the principal case, it was held that the legislature
had no power to suspend the operation
of a general law, in favor of an individual; and it was said that the exercise
of a power to enact that an individual
should not be held to answer to any suit,
except for a period of two years, was an
exercise of no greater power than to
enact that he should be held to answer
such suit for four years. The court expressly put its decision upon the ground
that the act conferred special powers, and
was therefore upconstitutional. Bearing in mind that the Supreme Court
of the United States has decided that
there is no vested right in a law to imprison a debtor (.MJason v. Haile, 12
Wheat. 370), we can easily agree with
the Supreme Court of Vermont that a
special act of the legislature discharging
a judgment-debtor from imprisonment on
an execution is void : Kendallv. Dodge,
3 Vt. 360 ; Lyman v. Mower, 2 Id. 517.
And the court rest their decision upon
the principle that "1an act conferring
upon any one citizen privileges to the
prejudice of another, and which is not
applicable to others in like circumstances,
in the language of the learned commentators upon the English law, does not
enter into the idea of municipal law,
having no relation to the community in
general :" Ward v. Barnard, I Aik.
121. Accordingly it was held that a
departure from the liberties of the prison,
under color of such an act, was an
escape: Id. See Starr v. Bobinson, 1
Chip. 257.
Undoubtedly the law is that the legis-
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lature has no power to grant new trials,
Lewis v. W~ebb, 3 Greenl. 326; Merrill
v. Sherburne, I N. H. 393; Inhabitants
of Durham. v. Inhabitants of Lewiston,
4 Greeni. 140, because an invasion of
the judicial department of the state by
the legislature ; yet the basis for these
decisions have not always been the one
just indicated. Legislation of this kind
is held to be obnoxious to the Constitution because it is class legislation:
icquet's Case, 5 Pick. 65; Bates v.
Kimball, 2 Chip. 77 ; Opinion of the
Judges of the Supreme Court of N'Vew
Hampshire, 4 N. H. 572.
And it has been expressly held that
the legislature has no power to grant a
divorce ; not upon the ground that it is
an invasion of one department of the
government into the province of another,
but because it is a special indulgence by
way of exemption from the general law:
Simonds v. Simonds, 103 Mass. 572.
Again, it has been held that the legislature, when forbidden to grant divorces,
cannot pass special acts authorizing the
courts to grant divorces in particular
cases for causes not recognised in the
general law, because it is a granting of
special privilege: Teft v. Tel?, 3 Alich.
67 ; nor can the general exemption laws
be varied for particular cases ; there
must be one uniform law: Bull v. Conroe, 13 Wis. 238. So courts cannot be
created for the trial of rights and obligations of particular persons, as the debtors
of a particular bank: Bank of the State
v. Cooper, 2 Yerg. 599. An act making
it a felony in the officers, agents or servants of a particular banking corporation, to embezzle or appropriate, without
authority, the funds of the corporation,
was adjudged a partial law, and unconstitutional and void, because it did
not embrace all persons in like state, and
under like circumstances : Budd v. State,
3 Humph. 483. The same was determined of an act authorizing the court to
dismiss Indian reservation cases, when
prosecuted for the use of another. It

was held a partial law, intended to operate only upon a few individuals : Wally's
Heirs v. Kennedy, 2 Yerg. 554. So also
of an act authorizing the executors of
one person deceased to revive a judgment obtained by another person in his
lifetime, in their names by scire faeias:
Tate v. Bdl, 4 Yerg. 202. And likewise
an act authorizing a particular person
named, to prosecute a suit then pending
in the name of the deceased party plaintiff, without taking out letters of administration upon the estate of such deceased:
Officer v. Young, 5 Yerg. 320. So also
an act authorizing the guardian of the
minor heirs of a deceased person to sell
lands which descended to the heirs from
their ancestor, and apply the proceeds in
payment of the ancestor's debts, though
passed with the assent of such minor
heirs: Jones's Heirs v. Perry, 10 Yerg.
59. A special statute exempting a particular city from the payment of cosis in
any proceeding against it to set aside a
tax or tax sale is void : Durkee v. Janesville, 28 Wis. 464 ; see State v. Bartlett,
35 Id. 287. So where a city could only
be incorporated under the general law
of the state, and the legislature were prohibited by the Constitution from passing
an act to incorporate any particular city,
and the legislature undertook to legalize
the void incorporation proceedings of a
particular town by a special act, it was
held that the special act was void-was
forbidden by the Constitution: City of
Logansport v. La Rose, 1 Ind. L. R.
587.
The court in the case last cited,
relied upon several Kentucky decisions.
It cited
fcReynolds v. Smallhouse, 8
Bush 447. That was where the legislature leased to a company for thirty
years the Green and Barren river line
of natigation, with the right to collect tolls, &c. We think this case is
clearly distinguishable from the principal
case. The rivers were public rivers-public highways. The state had improved them by a large expenditure of
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its funds.

The state saw fit in this way

to raise funds to keep them in repair, a
duty she owed to the public. The property was that of the state, so long as
the United States did not interfere-so
said the court. It will thus be seen that
the state was simply renting her own property, nothing more. Cor~monwealth v.
Jackson, 5 Bush 680, was also cited.
That was a suit against the state, authorized by a spehial act, in order to
ascertain Jackson's damages caused by a
wrongful act of the state's Board of Internal Improvement. No constitutional
question was discussed analogous to
the one discussed in the principal
case. The act wis the state simply
consenting to be sued in order to
do equity to one of her citizens.
Patterson v. Trabue, 3 J. J. Marshall
598, was a grant of land belonging to
the state, to an individual, upon condition that he would expend money
in the pursuit of salt water. This act
was passsed in 1820. The court very
properly held that the act was constitutional, although it gave the grantee absolute right to appropriate, of the public
land, 5000 acres situated within five
miles of the place where he was boring
for salt water. This was simply a grant
of the state's own lands and in no wise
affected the public. No public law of the
state was annulled ; no question of immunity from crime arose. Kibby v. Chitwood's .Admi'r., 4 T. B. lon. 91, was
where a guardian was authorized to sell
his ward's real estate to pay the ward's
ancestor's debt. The land was subject
to the debts and could be sold by the administrator. The court looked upon the
statute as providing a shorter and more
direct method of paying the debts-a
question of expediency-and that it
made but little difference how the land
was sold so the proceeds of the sale were
applied to the extinguishment of the
debts. It can hardly be deemed an authority.
In a number of decisions cited in this

note no constitutional provisions served
as a guide to the courts ; but the opinions of the courts were founded upon
those fundamental principles recognised
by jurists as essential to the validity of
laws enacted in those countries receiving
the common law as the basis of their
legislation-that the laws must be general and not the decrees of the enacting
body applicable only to an individual;
"that all freemen, when they form a
social compact, are equal, and that no
man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community,, but in consideration of publicservices.'t
-It is said in the principal case that
no citizen of the state is in court complaining of the action of the legislature ;
that no citizen of the state is complaining that the legislature had invaded his
special privileges as a citizen of the Commonwealth. The question is pertinent,
"How was it possible for any one citizen to appear in such an action and complain of the action of the legislature ?1
Are we to understand the .court to mean
by such an expression that if it were a
civil guit, brought by a citizen of the
Commonwealth against Whips, for the
recovery of property or maintaining of
some right necessarily connected with his
lottery scheme, that greater deference
would be paid to his complaint and the
action of the legislature more closely
scrutinized than was done in the principal case ? If so, then when the private
citizen sues the act may be declared unconstitutional, and when the Commonwealth sues it may be constitutional. A
legal absurdity. And it may be again
pertinently asked, " Was not the entire
body of the people of the Commonwealth
present in court by their duly constituted attorney complaining of the action
of thelegislature ?" They certainly were,
and as great, nay greater, deference
should be paid to their suit than to the
suit of an individual.
Nor is there any sound reasoning in
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the question of estoppel. An unconstitutional enactment of the legislature is
not law; it is of no more force than if
it never had been passed. Its passage
is not the act of the legislature as
an official enactment. No one is bound
by it, nor is any one bound to notice it,
The state is not estopped because her
officers recognised it as valid, and rights
of her citizens are acquired under it and
through the acts of her officers: Reid v.
State ex rel. Thompson, 74 Ind. 252.
We cannot regard this special act in
any other light than a legislative license
to violate the general law of the state.
All the citizens of the state are forbidden
to establish and run a lottery, but the
legislature has seen fit to grant the privilege to this individual, Whips. He,
above all others, enjoys a special favor.
Suppose all the citizens of the state were

permitted to establish and run a lottery
except Whips. Would it be contended
for a moment that the law was constitutional as to him? In that event the
court would regard the entire act unconstitutional, or else the proviso forbidding
Whips to engage in lottery schemes. The
legislatures of the respective states are
as 9upreme as Parliament in the highest
pitch of its power, subject only to the
Constitution of the United States and
laws made in pursuance thereof, public
treaties, and their own state constitutions; yet we very much doubt if even
an attempt, previous to this one, has ever
been made to exempt a citizen from the
provision of the general criminal law of
the state.
W. W. THORNTON.
Indianapolis, Ind.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILROAD CO. v. SORWINDLING.
'Where an infant is upon the platform of a railroad station, not as a passenger or
upon any business connected with the railroad company, the company owes him no
duty. Hence, if he be injured by a passing train he cannot recover against the
company for his injuries upon the theory that they have failed to discharge towards
him a legal duty and hence have been guilty of negligence.
Semble, that in such case the company would only be liable for a wanton or
intentional injury.

ERROR to the Common Pleas No. 1, of Allegheny county.
Case by William Schwindling, by his next friend Peter Schwind-

ling, against the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co., to recover
damages for an injury occasioned by the negligence of the company
defendant.

On the trial, before COLLIER, J., the following facts appeared: On
September 5th 1880, the plaintiff, a boy about five years of age, was
run over by a train of cars of defendant at Osceola.

On that

afternoon, the plaintiff, who lived with his parents in one of a row
of houses, built close along the line of the road, started to follow
his older brothers, who had been sent by their mother to the store

454

BALTIMORE & OHIO R. R. CO. v. SCHWINDLING.

across the defendant's track to make some purchases. He did not
actually cross the track with them, but stopped at the platform
connected with the defendant's station, where he was joined by his
brothers on their return from the store. They with some other
boys remained there some time, "to see the train come in," the
plaintiff being on the edge of the platform, so cloie to the track
that the iron step attached to one of the cars, which had been
broken and twisted outwards so that it projected several inches
beyond the side of the car, caught the plaintiff, and threw him
under the cars, which passed over his leg, causing the injuries for
which this suit was brought. The train was moving "very slowly"
at the time of the accident. It was further shown, on the part
of the plaintiff, that the people, young and old, living on opposite
sides of the track, were in the habit of passing and repassing
across the company's tracks; though there was no regular crossing
at that place. On the part of the defendant, it was shown that
none of the trainmen saw the boy until after he was hurt; and that
the men in charge of the train were all at their places, attending
to their duties. It was farther shown, that at the time of the
accident the boys, including the plaintiff, were playing about
the platform, and as the train came along were amusing themselves by trying to jump on and off the moving cars.
Defendant requested the court to charge as follows: That
under all the evidence in the case the verdict must be for the defendant. Refused. Verdict for plaintiff $2000 and judgment. The
defendant thereupon took this writ, assigning for error, inter alia,
the answer of the court to the defendant's points.
Geo. Shiras Jr., John He Oleave, Welty He Cullough and H1enry
Hf. Hoyt, Jr., for plaintiff in error.
H. Swartzwelder and Frank Thomson, for defendant in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered byGREEN, J.-At the time the plaintiff received his injury he was
standing on the platform of the defendant, so close to its edge,
that, according to the theory upon which the case was tried for
the plaintiff, he was struck by a slight projection from the, side of
a passing freight car.
He was not a passenger, he had no business of any kind with
the defendant, or any of its agents or employees; in fact, he was
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a boy of five or six years of age, amusing himself looking 'at the
moving train. He was not invited upon the platform by any agent
of the defendant, and he was not engaged in the act of crossing
either the track or the platform at the time of the accident. He
was simply loitering upon the edge of the platform, with no other
purpose or motive than his own personal enjoyment. His elder
brother, his principal witness, testified that he told him to come
back from where he was standing, but he refused to do so. A
passing car, moving at a very slow rate of speed, not exceeding
three or four miles an hour, with an iron step projecting a few
inches from the side of the car (as alleged by the plaintiff, though
denied by the defendant), struck him and pulled him from the
platform under the wheels of the car, so that he was run over and
injured. In these circumstances was there any right of recovery ?
We think clearly not. We held, in the case of G-illis v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 9 P. F. Smith 141, that "the platform of a
railroad company at its station or stopping-place, is in no sense a
public highway; there is no dedication to public use as such; it is
a structure erected expressly for the accommodation of passengers
arriving and departing in the train. Being unenclosed, persons
are allowed the privilege of walking over it for other purposes,
but they have no right to do so. * * * Still, even a trespasser
on the land of another can maintain an action for a wanton or
intentional injury inflicted on him by the owner." Again, on p.
143: " The plaintiff may not have been technically a trespasser;
the platform was open ; there was general license to pass over it ;
but he was where he had no legal right to be; his presence there
was in no way connected with the purposes for which the platform
was constructed. * * * As to all such persons to whom they stood
in such a relation as required care on their part, they were bound
to have the structure strong enough to bear all who could stand on
it; as to all others they were liable only for wanton or intentional
injury. The plaintiff was on the spot merely to enjoy himself, to
gratify his curiosity, or to give vent to his patriotic feelings. The
defendant had nothing to do with that." Upon the foregoing
principles, and upon the authority of many adjudicated cases cited
in the opinion, and which it is therefore not necessary to review
here, it was held there could be no recovery, although the platform
was insufficient to bear the weight of the persons who were upon it.
It was conceded that there would have been a right to recover if
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the persons on the platform had been there as passengers, or upon
business connected with the defendant. )
In the latter case there would have been a violation of a duty
owing by the defendant-to the plaintiff. But there was no. such
duty because of the absence of the relation, and hence there was'
no right of action. The controlling feature of the inquiry in all
such cases is, what was the duty which was violated by the defendant. If there was none, there is no legal liability; this was
essentially the distinction on which Railroadv. Hummell, 8 Wright
375, was decided.

On p. 379, STRONG, J., said: "Yet

a jury

cannot hold parties to a higher standard of care than the law
requires, and they cannot find anything negligence which is less
than a failure to discharge a legal duty. If the law declares, as it
does, that there is no duty resting upon any person to anticipate
wrongful acts in others, and to take precautions against such acts,
then the jury cannot say that a failure to take such precautions, is
a failure in duty, and negligence." * * * 14Blowing the whistle

of the locomotive, or making any other signal, was not a duty
owed to the persons in the neighborhood, and consequently the
fact that the whistle was not blown nor a signal made was no
evidence of negligence."
It will be perceived that it is entirely immaterial, in solving this
question, whether the person injured is an adult or a child.
There is no question of contributory negligence involved in the
inquiry or essential to its consideration. If the defendant did not
owe the duty of protection against the injury suffered in the particular case, the omission to furnish such protection is not negligence, and there is no liability on that ground. Take the present
case as an illustration. The only duty which is or can be claimed
as having been violated was a duty to protect the plaintiff, when
standing upon the edge of the defendant's platform, from injury
from a car-step projecting a few inches beyond the side of a slowly
passing car. But how can any such duty arise out of such circumstances.. The plaintiff had no right to place himself in the position in which it was possible for him to be injured in such a manner,
and the defendant was not bound to take precaution against such
injury. It is not denied that thiis would be true if the plaintiff
was an adult; how then can it be otherwise than true as to a child ?.
The absence of duty is precisely the same in either case, and the
consequent absence of liability must be the same in both. It is
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quite true that young children can recover for injuries in circum;
stances in which adults cannot. But even children cannot recover
unless there is negligence, and there can be no negligence without
a breach of duty.
In K[ay v. Pennsylvania Bailroad Co., 15 P. F. Smith 276,
we said: "if there be no negligence on the part of the company,
then the incapacity of the child creates no liability, and its injury
is its own misfortune which it must bear."
In Philadelphia and Beading Railroad Co. v. Spearen, 11
Wright 300, where a child five years old suddenly ran across the
track in front of an approaching engine, and was struck and
injured, we said on page 303: "The engine in this case having
safely passed the crossing appropriated to travellers, the engineer
was under no duty to suppose any one would attempt to cross the
track suddenly right in front of the engine. He had a right to
suppose a clear track, and was not guilty in failing to use precaution where he had no reason to expect interruption." In Hfargraves
v. Deacon, 25 Mich. 1, the court said: "The plaintiff being a
child of tender years, we have found no support for any rule which
would protect those (child or adult) who go where they are not
invited, but merely with express or tacit permission, from curiosity
or motives of private convenience, in no way connected with
business or other relations with the occupant." In Morrissey v.
Edstern Railroad Co., 126 Mass. 377, the action was brought by
a child four years of age, who was injured while playing upon the
track of the defendant.
The court said : " The plaintiff at the time of the accident was.
a mere intruder and trespasser upon the railroad track. No
inducement or implied invitation to him to enter upon it had been
held out. He was neither a passenger, nor on his way to become
one, but was there merely for his own amusement, and was using
the track for a play-ground. The defendant corporation owed him
no duty, except the negative one, not maliciously or with gross and
reckless carelessness to run over him."
In Gillespie v. He Gowan, 39 Leg. Int. 313, we held that the
owners of unenclosed lots in Philadelphia owed no duty of protection, even to children, against the danger of falling into an open
well on the premises, although the field in question was crossed byfrequented paths and used as a place of resort by children and adults.
In Moore v. Philadelphiaand Reading Railroad Cb.,. 39 Leg..
VOL. XXXI.-58
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Int. 290, we held there could be no recovery for the death of a boy
ten years of age who was struck by an engine while walking on
and along the track, on the end of the cross-ties. We said : " The
circumstance that the trespasser in this instance was a boy ten
years of age cannot affect the application of the rule. The
defendant owed him no greater duty than if he had been an adult."
In the case of Philadelphiaand Reading 1ailroad Co. v. Heil,
5 Weekly Notes 91, a child four years of age was struck, as it
was claimed, by the projecting axle-box of a car, which extended
one foot six inches beyond the outside of the rail and three inches
over the line of the street curb. He was on the public streetwalk, where he had a right to be, but he was so close to the car
that he was struck, as was supposed, by the projecting axle. We
held that there was no sufficient evidence of negligence in these
circumstances to submit the case to a jury. The cases of injuries
to persons while crossing the track at permissive crossings
are not analogous, and have no application. When the right to
cross at a particular place is established, by permission or otherwise,
the duty of ordinary care is incumbent upon the company. But,
in the present case, the plaintiff was not engaged in the act of
crossing the track, or even the platform, when he was injured, and
therefore the cases on this subject are not in point. Upon the
whole case, we discern no evidence of any breach of duty owing by
the defendant to the plaintiff. There was no pretence of wanton
injury, and therefore the first and second points of the defendant
should have been affirmed.
Judgment reversed.
The right ot a child to recover for

the injury: (ardner v. Grace, 1 Fost.

& Fin. 352; Hughes v. 3facfie, 2 H. &
injuries incurred while trespassing, in
C. 744; Chicago v. Starr, 42 Ill. 174;
light of the principal case and the recent
Railway Co. v. Connell, 88 Penn. St.
decisions in New York and in England,
is by no means clear. Mist-akes may 520 ; the line of cases of which Bird v.
Holbrook, 4 Bing. 628, is generally conreadily arise by confounding cases of this
kind with those where the parents of the sidered the leading case, does not affect
the question, because they are cases of
child sue for injuries, and the contribugross negligence. The right of a child
tory negligence of the parents becomes
to recover is dependent upon some negan element: Waite v. Railway Co.,
E., B. & E. 719 ; Schmidt v. Railroad ligence of the party upon whose property
Co., 23 Wis. 186; Aleeks y. Railroad he trespasses ; for if there be no negligence no blame can arise upon which to
Co., 52 Cal. 602; Smith v. Railway Co.,
found an action : Singleton v. Railway
92 Penn. St. 450; and those in which
Co., 7 0. B. (N. S.) 287 ; Harfield v.
the child has done other acts negligent in
Roper, 21 Wend. 615; Railroad Co. v.
themselves, which contribute directly to
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Biommell, 44 Penna. St. 375 ; Chester v.
Porter, 47 Ill.66; Manly v. Railroad
Co., 74 N. 0. 655; Bulger v. Railroad Co., 56 Ind. 396; Morrissey v.
PRailroad Co., 126 Mass. 377 ; Hicdks
v. Railroad Co., 64 Mo. 430 ; but even
upon a question as plain apparently as
this, doubt seems to have been cast in the
case of Lygo v. Newbold, 9 Exch. 302,
ALDERSo*, J., says, "It

seems strange

that a person who rides in his carriage
without a servant, if a-child receives an
injury by getting up behind, for the purpose of having a ride, should be liable
for the injury," evidently imagining that
the rule which had been laid down in the
leading case of Lynch v. Nurdin, gave a
trespassing child a right to recover for
injuries in any erent, and PoLrocw, C.
B., in delivering judgment in the same
case, says, "The case last put raises a
doubt as to the authority of Lynch v.
Nrurdin, if it be applicable to the case
where a child receives an injury from
indulging in what is called ' the natural
instinct of a child,' by getting up behind
a gentleman's carriage, there being no
servant there ;" so in a very late case in
Pennsylvania, Gillespie v. 1cGowan, 12
Weekly Notes 413, PAXsoN, 3., says,
"It is part of a boy's nature to trespass,
especially where there is tempting fruit ;
yet I never heard that it was the duty
of the owner of a fruit tree to cut it
down.because a boy trespasser may possibly fall from its branches. Yet the
principle contended for by the plaintiff
would bring us to this absurdity if carried to its logical conclusion."
There is no doubt that a dangerous
employment, such as the manufacture of
gunpowder and explosives, the running
of railroads and others equally dangerous, may be carried on with no right
upon the part of the public, adult or
infant, to recover for injuries if carried
on with all possible care at proper places
and without negligence ; nor is there any
doubt that adults can recover where
injured by gross negligence or wanton-
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ness, even though the injury happen
while they are trespassing upon the private enclosures of others who owe no
apparent duty to the world at large save
that established by the courts in the
maxim sic utere tuo, tt alienum non lwdas;
certainly, therefore, in cases of gross
negligepce or wantonness, such as setting
traps, spring guns, &e., a child could
recover, as well as an adult, on the
ground of the general duty owed all
alike. Now it seems much more just
that as a child is much weaker and more
likely, from its inexperience to gratify
its instincts of curiosity, that a greater
degree of care should be required towards them than towards adults, and
that where no positive negligence can be
fixed upon the child, save that arising
from what has been well called "the
natural instinetof a child," that it would
not be going too far to say that every
negligence amounts to a breach of duty
towards them. Mr. Thompson, in his
book on Negligence, says, vol. 2, p.
1183, n. 3, "It is important to bear
in mind, in actions for injuries to children, a very simple and fundamental
fact which, in this class of cases is sometimes strangely lost sight of, viz. : that
no action arises without a breach of duty.
It is doubtless true that the public are
held to a higher degree of care towards
children than adults, and that children
of tender years are incapable of negligence ; but from these facts it must not
be hastily concluded that an action can
be maintained in every case of injury."
For the purposes of this article I will
only discuss cases where the action was
instituted by the child through his next
friend to recover for injuries happening
to him while trespassing, leaving out, si,
far as is possible, all cases where other
acts of the child, besides the trespass,
contributed directly to the injury and all
cases of contributory negligence of the
parents where they sue.
The leading case is Lynch v. Nurdin,
1 Q. B. 29, decided in 1841, by DEN.
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while chief justice of the .Queen's
Bench, in England. It arose as follows:
Upon the day of the accident, defendant's carman left his horse and car standing in the street alone for one-half hour,
while he went into a house; plaintiff, a
boy under seven, climbed upon the
wagon, and another boy started the
horse, when plaintiff, attempting to get
off the shaft, fell and was run over by
the wheel and his leg broken; WiLLIAMS, J., left it to the jury to say
whether it was negligence in the defendant's servant to leave the horse and cart,
and also whether that negligence occasioned the accident. They, answering the
points in the affirmative, found a verdict
for the plaintiff. On motion for a new
trial, DE.NrsAN, 0. J., delivering the
opinion, says : "But the question remains, can the plaintiff, then, consistently with the authorities, maintain his
action, having been at least equally in
fault? The answer is, that be merely
indulged the natural instinct of a child
in amusing himself with the empty cart
and deserted horse: then, we think, that
defendant cannot be permitted to avail
himself of that fact. The most blamable
carelessness of his servant having
tempted the child, be ought not to reproach the child with yielding to that
temptation. He has been the real and
only cause of the mischief. He has been
deficient in ordinary care; the child, acting without prudence or thought, has,
however, shown these qualities in as great
a degree as he could be expected to possess
them. His misconduct bears no proportion to that of the defendant which produced it."
This case seems to have been concurred
in for some years. In 1854, in Lygo v.
Newbold, supra, Baron PAnKr, said,
during the argument, "the decision in
Lynch v. Nurdin, proceeded wholly upon
the ground that the plaintiff had taken as
much care as could be expected from a
child of tender years-in short, that the
plaintiff was blameless, and consequently
]iuAN,

that the act of the plaintiff did not affect
the question," while ALDPSON, B., and
PoLLocw, 0. B., although they did not
say the case was wrongly decided, questioned it and seemed to think it might be
carried too far.
(See the remark of
AMARTIw, B., in Waite v. Railway Co.,
E., B. & MI. 729.) In 1863, two cases
were heard together before tke Court of
Exchequer: Htqhes v. Miacfie, and Abbott
v. ,Llacfic, 2 H. & C. 744 ; they arose
out of the same state of facts : The defendants were sugar refiners, the cellar
of their warehouse extended under the
street and opened into it. The opening
when not required to receive or discharge
casks was covered by a large wooden
flap or lid, with three cross bars on its
lower face, fitting into stone grooves
which formed its support. On the day
of the accident the defendant's workmen
had removed the flap and having reared
it against the wall nearly upright, with
its lower face towards the street, had
gone away. The plaintiff, Abbott, a
child of seven years old, was playing
in the street, when a child of five years
Hughes (the plaintiff), got upon the
cross bars of the flap, and in jumping
down caught some part of the flap with
his jacket and pulled it over upon himself and the other plaintiff. In Hughes
and Macfie, the case of the boy who
caused the accident, FoLLocx, C. B., delivering the opinion sustaining the. nonsuit, says : "In the case in which Hughes
was the plaintiff, the flap was pulled over
by the plaintiff, a child of tender years,
by playing on it and jumping from it,
when it fell upon him and hurt him
severely. Had he been an adult it is
clear he could have maintained no action.
He would voluntarily have meddled for
no lawful purpose with that which if left
alone would not have hurt him. He
would therefore, at all events, have contributed by his own negligence to his
damage. We think the fact of the plaintiff being of tender years makes no difference. His touching was for no lawful

BALTIMORE & OHIO R. R. CO. v. SCHWINDLING.
purpose, and if he could maintain the
action he could equally do so if the flap
had been placed inside the defendant's
premises within sight and reach of the
child.'
" As to the other action in which
Abbott was plaintiff, the case is different. If he was playing with Hughes, so
as to be a joint actor with him, he cannot maintain this action. If not, we
think he can, as his injuries would then
be the result of the joint negligence of
Hughes and the defendant."
These cases do not apparently rest
upon the ground of the child's being a
trespasser; but upon his contributory
negligence; they are also predicated
upon negligence in the defendant, for the
second case was sent back for a retrial, at
which the jury found fdr the defendant
No report is preserved of this new trial,
so it cannot be discovered whether for
contributory negligence of the child or
lack of negligence of the defendant. It
might be well to note that POLLOCK,
C. B., who delivered the opinion in tygo
v. Newbold, also delivered this opinion.
Before the same court, in 1866, arose
the case of Mangan v. Atterton, 1 H. & C.
388, where defendant exposed, at Litchfield, in the public street or market,
without an attendant, a crushing machine having on one side a set of cog
wheels to work the rollers, and on the
other side a handle by which the wheels
were set in motion.
The plaintiff, a
boy, four years old, accompanied by his
brother, seven years of age, and other
boys, coming upon this machine on their
way to school, stopped; one boy turned
the handle while the plaintiff put his fingers in the cogs and three were crushed
so severely that they had to be amputated.
The judge instructed the jury if they
thought the machine dangerous to find
for the plaintiff, which they accordingly
did. On motion, a new trial was granted
by the court in bane. IlAtTnx, B. :.
"Whatever negligence there may have
been in leaving the machine in such a

condition as to afford the boy an opportunity of turning the handle, it is far too
remote to render the defendant liable for
the injury done to the plaintiff. In my
opinion the judge ought to have told the
jury that there was no negligence on the
part of the defendant."
BR LWELL,
B., "Suppose he had painted it with
some poisonous paint, and the child had
sucked it, would he have been liable?
In my opinion he had a perfect right to
exhibit his machine in the market place,
and he is not liable for injury caused by
the plaintiff and his companion improperly meddling with it." I take it this
case simply decides that there was no
negligence on the part of defendant, so
that no matter how blameless the child
might have been no action could lie, and
however we may disagree with the court
as to that fact, the case in no way impairs
the rule of law laid down in Lynch Y.
Nurdiu.
In Clark v. Clambers, L. R., 3 Q. B.
Div. 327-339, decided in 1878, a case
of negligence brought by an adult for
injuries, CoCanuin, 0. J., delivering
the opinion of the court and speaking of
Manpan v. Atterton, says: "It appears
to us that a man who leaves, in a public
place, along which persons, and among
them children, have to pass, a dangerous
machine which may be fatal to anyone
who touches it, without any precaution
against mischief, is not only guilty of
negligence, but of negligence of a very
reprehensible character, and not the less
so because the imprudent and unauthorized act of another may be necessary to
realize the mischief to which the unlawful actor negligence of the defendant has
given occasion."
In 1874, the Court of Exchequer, in
the case of Williams v. The Great Western Railway Co., L. II., 9 Exch. 157,
again considered the right of a child to
recover damages for negligence although
a trespasser. The plaintiff, a child four
and a half years old, was found lying on
the rails of defendant's road by a foot-
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path, with one foot severed from his body.
The company had not fenced their road
for 300 feet at a crossing near by, nor
was it fenced at this point, although required so to be by law. The whole court
(PoLLocr. being one of the judges) held
that the child might recover, although
evidently a trespasser.
It would seem therefore that although
there has been some dissent to the case
of Lynch v. iMurdin, the weight of anthority in England sustains it. The only
case whose judgment directly impairs its
authority being Hughes v. Macfie, where
it was cited in argument but not mentioned in the opinion. The intemperate
language in the cases of Lygo v. N\Tewbold and 21angan v. Acterton may well be
considered overbalanced by the weight
of such authorities as Chief Justices
DEN3MAx, CocxBvtN and Chief Baron
KELLY.

There is a ground upon which all
of these cases may be considered as
unconflicting and sound, which is, that
altfiough a child may recover, if a trespasser, for injuries occasioned by negligence, yet if besides trespassing the
child contribute directly by its own action
to the injury, even if there is negligence,
then he cannot recover. If this be the
rule which is to he read between the lines
of Hughes v. M1acfie and Mangan v. Atterlon, then they are perfectly reconcilable
with Lynch v. Nlurdin.
.Perhaps the earliest and most frequently quoted decision in the United
States is Birge v. Gardiner, 19 Conn.
507, in 1849, where a child between six
and seven, playing upon the lane on
which his parents resided, took hold of a
gate upon defendant's land, shook it and
thereby occasioned it to fall and injure
him. The negligence of which it was alleged the defendant was guilty,was knowingly permitting the gate to be insecure.
No question of trespass was spoken of by
the judge in the court below, who submitted the case to the jury in these
words: "In determining this question

it was proper for, and the duty of the
jury to, take into consideration the age
and condition of the plaintiff; whether
his conduct was the result of any fault
or negligence on his part, and whether it
was not the result of childish instinct
and thoughtlessness."
This was upheld
in the Supreme Court, Chief Justice
Ctuiane
saying : "It might, perhaps,
have been going too far for the court to
have said, as a matter of law, that a
child of this age could not be so blameworthy as to excuse the defendant. We
will not say that such cases may not be
imagined, or may not sometimes occur.
But it was favorable to the defendant,
and he cannot complain of it that the
age and condition of the plaintiff; connected with the circumstances of the
case, were put to the jury for them to
determine what degree of fault, if any,
was imputable to the plaintiff." Lynch
v. A"urdin was cited and relied on. The
court expressly say, however, that they
do not decide whether the plaintiff was
a trespasser or not. Yet in 1858, in
Daley v. Rlilroad Co., 26 Conn. 591,
where a child of three trespassing upon
a railroad was injured through the negligence of the railroad company, a case
elaborately considered, they permit a
recovery by the child, although the
parent was so negligent that he himself
could not have recovered, citing and
relying on both Lynch v. nurdin and
Birge v. Gardiner. In Robinson v. Cone,
22 Vt. 213 (1850), the Supreme Court of
Vermont arrived at the same conclusion
as the Connecticut court in Birge v. Gardiner, again relying on Lynch v. Nlurdin
as settling the law. In 1858 an important case bearing upon this question was
decided by the Supreme Court of Tennessee: Whirley v. Wlhiteman, I Head.
610.
The facts are 'very similar to
Mangan v. Atterton, but a different conclusion is reached from them.
The
defendants, owners of a paper-mill, connected with the mill, machinerythat had
been constructed to draw up wood from
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a river on a truck; outside of the wall
of the mill some eight or ten inches was
fixed a cog-wheel, about twenty-six
inches in diameter, which was geared
into another cog-wheel for the purpose
of moving the truck. These cogs were
about twenty feet from the street, in an
open space, entirely exposed without any
cover, guard or enclosure whatever. The
plaintiff, a child of three and one-half,
was caught and injured, while the engineer was away and the wheels were
running, so that his leg had to be amputated. The proof showed that the wheels
might have. been boxed at a trifling
expense. A verdict was found for the
defendant, which the Supreme Court
reversed on the ground that it was the
duty of the court to have instructed the
jury specifically, as a matter of law, that
the facts stated, if true, constituted that
degree of negligence which would render
the defendants liable in damages, and
this notwithstanding the child was a
trespasser.
The Supreme Court of the United
States passed upon this question in 1873,
in Railroad Co. v. Stout, 17 Wall. 657.
There a railroad had upon its own land,
near two roads in a hamlet of about 150
persons, an unenclosed turntable, revolv
ing easily on its axis, unguarded and
unlocked, the latch being broken. The
plaintiff, a child of six years of age,
without the knowledge of his parents, set
off, with two boys, one nine and the
other ten, with no definite purpose. It
was proposed by one (f them to go to
the turntable to play; on arriving there,
two of them began to turn the table, and
plaintiff's foot was caught and crushed in
attempting to get upon it. The defendants disclaimed negligence on the part of
plaintiff. The question of the negligence
of the railroad company was left to the
jury, who returned a verdict for plaintiff, which the Supreme Court affirmed,
citing and relying upon Lynch v. Nurdin,
among other cases.
In Keffe v. Railroad Co., 21 Mlinn.

207, and Koons v. Railroad Co., 65 Mlo.
592, both of which were cases of children being caught in turntables which
were out of order, while trespassing,
under circumstances almost identical
with Railroad Co. v. Stout, the companies
were held liable, and verdicts for the
plaintiff were sustained.
In New York, the recent cases conflict.
Mangan v. Brooklyn Railroad Co., 38
X. Y. (Court of Appeals) 455, arose in
1868. Plaintiff sued for injuries caused
by having been run over by defendant's
car; he was between three and four
years of age when left by his sister alone
on a balcony in the rear of his father's
house; the only mode by which he could
get to the street was through an open
window, four feet from the ground; he
got to the street and passed in front of
the mules drawing defendant's car, but
was struck by the dash board, knocked
down and received the injury for which
suit was brought; it was in evidence that
the driver of the car had caught a pigeon,
which he had in his hands, having wound
his lines around the brake, and was paying no attention.
The court below
granted a nonsuit which, on appeal, was
reversed.
In Mullaney v. Spence, 15 Abb. Pr.
319 (1874), where a child, four years
and six months old, was injured while
trespassing on an elevator, operated by
defendant, close to the street, which had
been negligently left open and unguarded;
the court again reiterated the doctrine of
Lynch v. Nurdin, and Mangan v. Railroad Co., and held that the question of
the parent's negligence should have been
sent to the jury.
In McAlpin v. Powell, 55 How. ]Pr.
163, in 1878, however, where a bright
boy, ten years of age, stepped on a fire
escape, required to be kept in repair by
statute, where he had no business to be,
and passed to the end, where there was
a trap door, which gave way and precipitated him to the ground, killing him,
the Court of Appeals held that the de-
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fendant owed no duty to plaintiff, he
being a trespasser, following Hughes v.
Macfie, and M'angan v. Atterton, and
distinguishing Lynch v. Nurdin, on the
ground that there the child was attracted
to the place where the accident happened
by the blamable negligence of the defendant-MLLER, J., saying: "A child
is permitted to go into the pubiic streets,
which are open to persons of all ages,
without being chargeable with negligence,
and being there, if led by attraction into
danger, even although it may be that
under the circumstances an action would
lie for injuries occasioned thereby, such
a case has no similarity to one where the
child is left without any one to take especial charge of him, and escapes through
an open unguarded window to a place of
danger, and sustains an injury without any allurements being held out to
him. A wide distinction exists between
the two cases, and while the one at bar
is on the border line, and the point of
difference is perhaps very close, this distinction is fully recognised in the best
considered adjudications in the courts,
and is the turning point upon which cases
of this character are to be determined."
The cases selected as a basis for this
conclusion do not at all sustain it; for
instance, Mangan v. Atterton, cited and
relied on, was clearly a case where attractions were held out to children in the
shape of a crank to turn; Hughes and
Macfie was a case of contributory negligence, and the balance are cases either
where there was no negligence or they
were actions brought by adults from
whom more care is required.
The first reference to this doctrine in
Pennsylvania is to be found in the opinion of WOODWARD, J., in Rauch v.
Lloyd, 31 Penn. St. 370, where he cites
Lynch v. Nurdin, and Robinson v. Cone,
and states that the preponderance of both
reason and authority is favorable to them.
In Railroad Co. v. Spearen, 47 Penn.
St. 304, AGxEW, J., says: "It would
be a hard rule that would hold a child of

five years of age to the same measure of
care and diligence in avoiding the consequences of the neglect or unlawful acts
of others which is required of adults.
There is authority for this, Rauch v.
Lloyd;" also Lynch v. Nurdin, and further, "If an adult should place himself
upon the railroad where he has no right
to be, but where the company is entitled
to a clear track, and the benefit of the
presumption that itwillnotbe obstructed,
and should be run down, the company
would be liable only for wilful injury or
its counterpart, gross negligence. But if
a child of tender years should do so and
suffer injury, the company would be liable for the want of ordinary care. The
principle may be illustrated thus : If the
engineer saw the adult in time to stop his
train, but the train being in full view,
and nothing to indicate to him a want
of consciousness of its approach, he
would not be bound to stop his train.
Having the right to a clear track, he
would be entitled to the presumption that
the trespasser would remove from it in
time to avoid the danger, or if he thought
the person did not notice the approaching
train, it would be sufficient to whistle to
attract his attention without stopping.
But if instead of the adult it were a little
child upon the track, it would be the duty
of the engineer to stop his train upon
seeing it. In the former case the adult
concurring in the negligence causing the
disaster, is without remedy, in the latter
the child not concurring, from a want of
capacity, the want. of ordinary care in
the engineer would create liability." In
Smith v, O'Connor, 48 Penn. St. 218, the
same cases are cited with approval.
In Railroad Co. v. Mahoney, 57 Penn.
St. 187, the plaintiff, a child of four,
was injured while in the arms of her
aunt, who was trying to rescue her while
trespassing upon the railroad track ; the
court, though denying the right of the
representatives of the aunt to recover
for her death, supported a judgment for
the injuries inflicted upon the child, the
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engineer of the company being negligent.
So, also, in Kay v. Railroad Co., 65
Penn. St. 269, where a child trespassed
upon the land of the railroad company,
and was injured by a car, permitted to
run down a grade and around a curve
without attendance, tie court said the
question had been settled in that state,
citing the above cases and Lynch v. Sturdin. So, again, in the case of Hydraulic
ll'orks v. Orr, 83 Penn. St. 332, several
children strayed into a private alley, ten
feet wide, alongside of and upon the property of the Hydraulic work§, and usually
shht off from the public street by gatei
which, however, were open, at the time of
the accident. While there the child of
plaintiff was killed by the falling of a platform, weighing 800 pounds, about twenty
feet up the alley, used to receive goods,
and when not in use thrown back agains'
the house -wall on hinges upon which it
moved. This platform was only kept in
its place by its slight inclination against
the wall and was liable to be tilted over
whenever touched. The verdict for the
plaintiff was sustained on the ground
that some duty was owed the child
although a trespasser.
The court, however, made a departure
from their rule as originally laid down
in Railroad Co. v. Spearen, in the case
of Cauley v. Railroad Co., 95 Penn. St.
39"8 in 1880, where on trial it was
offered to prove that the plaintiff, a boy
of seven years, was playing on a sand
laden car standing on a switch, the
train was moved and while in motion
the conductor ordered him off; in jumping he fell under the wheels and was
injured ; also that a brakeman approached
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the boy in a threatening manner immediately before lie jumped off. The court
refused this evidence on the ground that
the boy was a trespasser and that the
company owed him no duty, and entered a
nonsuit. The Supreme Court sustained
this ruling, saying: "It is sufficient to say
that the child being unlawfully upon the
car, the defendant company owed it no
duty and is not liable forthe injury." This
case was followed by Gillespie v. MlcGowan, 12 Weekly Notes 413, where the court
say : "Hydraulic Works
vs. Orr, is authority oaly for its own facts. It was not
intended to assert the doctrine that 'a
child cannot be treated as a trespasser
or wrongdoer,' and so far as it appears
to sanction such a principle it must be
And the
considered as overruled."
principal case may be considered as
reaffirming the doctrine that no duty
is owed to a trespasser, even though
of tender years.
With all deference to such courts as
the Court of Appeals in New York,
and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
it would seem, upon a careful examination
of all the cases, that these courts are in
conflict with the weight of authority both
in the United States and England, and
that the last.decisions in those two states
are an entire departure from the rules laid
down in the earlier cases of those states,
and the reason that would relieve a railroad company from the result of its own
negligence in injuring a little child
straying upon its station which offers an
invitation to all the world to enter is at
least rather difficult to understand.
0. BER r..y TAYLOR.
Philadelphia.

TILTON v. WRIGHT.

Supreme Court of M~aine.
TILTON v. WRIGHT.
An attorney at law is liable to the officer for his fees for the service of writs
delivered by him to such officer, although he is neither the plaintiff nor a party in
interest; likewise to the clerk of courts for fees on writs delivered by him to such
clerk for entry. And neither the officer nor the clerk is required to perform the
services without a prepayment of fees.

ON exceptions. Assuinpsit on account annexed for fees as
sheriff for the service of writs and other processes, received from
the defendant, an attorney at law, amounting to $188.50. The
writ also contained a count for money had and received and was
dated September 5th 1881. The jury returned a verdict for
$72.93; and the defendant alleged exceptions, which are sufficiently
stated in the opinion.
.Polsomand M'Ierrill, for plaintiff.
James Wright, for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
APPLETON, 0. J.-This is an action of assumpsit to recover
fees due for the service of writs made by the defendant, and by
him delivered to the plaintiff for service.
To the rulings of the justice presiding at nisi prius, various
exceptions have been alleged.
1. It is insisted by the defendant that as an attorney he was
only responsible for the fees on writs, handed an officer for service,
in suits when he was the plaintiff or the party in interest.
Writs are usually handed to the sheriff for service and to the
clerk of the courts for entry, by the attorney by whom they were
made. The attorney has a lien on the judgment recovered, for all
his fees and disbursements included in the taxable bill of costs, which
embraces both the service of the writ and the entry of the action.
The attorney having such lien, hands the writ for service to the
sheriff, or to the clerk for entry. Neither the one nor the other
is obliged to perform the- services required, without a prepayment
of their respective fees. The sheriff serving, and the clerk entering the action without prepayment, a promise on the part of the
attorney to pay each their respective dues may be reasonably
inferred, unless notice to the contrary be seasonably given.
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Accordingly it has been repeatedly held, that the attorney is
responsible to the sheriff and the clerk for the fees on writs handed
by him to the one for service and to the other for entry. In
Tarbell v. Dickinson, 3 Cush. 345, it was held that an attorney
who employs an officer to serve a writ, and gives him directions
therefor, is responsible for the officer's fees for such service. In
Towle v. Hateh, 43 N. H. 270, it was decided when writs of
mesne or final process are committed to the sheriff for service by
the attorney who sues them out, that a promise by such attorney
will ordinarily be implied unless repelled by the proof; but it is
otherwise, when the writs are not so delivered by him, although he
may have' indorsed them. In 2 Gall. 1U1, an attachment was
issued against an attorney, on the motion of the marshal, to
compel the payment of his fees for the service of sundry writs,
brought by an inhabitant of another state, but indorsed by such
attorney.
"We are satisfied," remarks STORY J., "that an attachment may

issue to compel the payment of the fees due to the officers of the
court for the performance of their official duties."
In Adams v. Hopkins, 5 Johns. 253, and in Ousterlout v.
-Day,9 Johns. 114, it was decided that the attorney was liable to
the sheriff for his fees. In 1rustees of Watertown v. Cowen, 5
Paige 510, WALWORT, Oh., says that it has "been the uniform
practice," in that state, "for the sheriffs, clerks, masters, registers
and other officers of the several courts of record, to charge their
fees to the attorney or solicitor of the party, for whose benefit the
service was performed; * * * from the uniform practice on this
subject, there is an implied assumpsit by the attorney or solicitor,
to pay for services done for his client in the cause, by his express
or implied request." In Judson v. Gray, 1 Kernan 408, where
it was attempted to hold an attorney for the fees of a referee,
SELDEN, J., vigorously controverted the extensive liability of an
attorney, as set forth by WALWORTH, Oh., in the last case cited.
In the conclusion of his opinion, he expressly states that he does
not intend to interfere with the doctrine advanced in the case of
Adams v. Hopkins, above cited, where the liability of the attorney
to the sheriff was fully recognised.
The attorney is the immediate employer of the sheriff, who cannot be expected to know the parties or their responsibility. There
is no more reason for sending the sheriff to the party for his fees,
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than there is for sending the clerk to the party for his fees, as they
may arise in the progress of the cause. They both stand on the
same footing.
(The remainder of the opinion is devoted to questions of
local practice.)
In some states, by statute, an attorney
becomes liable for costs. Thus, in South
Carolina, an attorney is held liable for
clerks' and sheriffs' fees, when the plaintiff in the suit resides out of the state :
Benson v. Whiield, 4 McCord (S. C.)
149. In Georgia, also, an attorney instituting a sait for one who resides out
of tie state, is liable for all costs if the
suit is dismissed; or if judgment be obtained, and execution be returned unsatisfied, he is still liable: Carmichael v.
Pendleton, Dudley (Ga.) 173. In New
York, also, an attorney is liable for costs
to the amount of $100, when lie takes
proceedings in a suit after his client has
removed from the state; and this
whether the costs accrued before or after
such removal: Wright v. Black, 2 Wend.
258; Waring v. Barret, 2 Cow. 460;
Jones v. Savage, 10 Wend. 621.
For
some cases bearing somewhat upon the
question see Llfoir v. Brown, 9 How. Pr.
270 ;"Boyce v. Bates, 8 Id. 495 ; Willmont v. Meserole, 48 Id. 430.
Where one is made lessor in ejectment,
without his consent, the plaintiff's attorney is liable for costs: People v. Bradt,
6 Johns. 318.
An attorney who indorses his client's
writs, "A. B. by C. D., his attorney,"
is personally liable for costs, if the plaintiff avoid or is unable to pay for them :
Chapmanv. Phillips, 8 Pick. 25 ; Offlcer4
v. Hines, 33 Ga. 516 ; Davis v. MeArthur, 3 Me. 27 ; Chadwick v. Upton, 3
Pick. 442 ; How v. Codman, 4 Me. 79;
contra, Miner v. Smith, 6 N. H. 219;
Buggles v. Ives, 6 Mass. 494.
There are several authorities holding
that the attorney-of record cannot be held
liable for the fees of officers of the court,
unless there is an express promise to pay

them, or unless there has been some
course of dealing between the attorney.
and the clerk, from which such personal
promise can be implied: Wires v. Briggs,
Vt.r 101 ; Preston v. Preston, 1 Doug.
(Mich.) 292 ; Moore v. Porter, 13 S. &
R. 100. But in New York the rule seems
to be otherwise. There an attorney is
liable to the sheriff for fees on process
delivered to him for execution : Birkbeckv. Stafford, 23 How. Pr. 236; Campbell
V. Cothran, 56 N. Y. 279.
An attorney is held personally liable
to the prothonotary, when he is the plaintiff or plaintiff in interest, or when fees
have been received by him due the prothonotary: Cone v. Donaldson, 47 Penn.
St. 363.
An attorney is not liable for witness
fees, where the witness is summoned to
testify for his client, unless there is an
express promise to pay them: Sargeant
v. Pettibone, 1 Aik. (Vt.) 355 ; Robins
v. Bridge, 3 Mlees. & W. 114.
The rule governing the liability of
attorneys for the fees of sheriffs does not
extend to under solicitors in chancery
liable to a referee, appointed by the
courts to state an account in a suit for
his fees: Judson v. Gray, 11 N. Y. 408;
Howell v. Kinney, I How. Pr. 105;
Lanoreux v. Morris, 4 Id. 245.
A request by an attorney to court officers, stenographers, &c., for the performance of services incidental to a cause,
does not raise an implied liability upon
tde attorney to pay. The presumption
is that such liability is upon the client;
Bonynge v. Waterbury, 12 Hun 534;
&heridan v. Genet, Id. 660. The same
process which would lie against a suitor
to compel payment of fees can be maintained against his attorney who indorses
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the writ, when, by the local law, the
attorney is liable for costs, when the
client becomes unable or avoids doing
so: Anon., 2 Gall. 101. An attorney is
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liable to pay the costs on sham pleas,
although instructed so to plead: Vincent
v. Groome, I Chit. 182.
ADDISoN G. MOKEAN.

Supreme Court of Ohio.
SCOTT v. PERLEE.
A citizen of one state may contract in another state for a loan of money to be used
in the state of his residence, and agree to pay interest therefor, lawful by the laws
of the latter state, although the rate exceeds that allowed by the laws of the state
where the contract is made.
In such case the contract is not rendered usurious by the fact that the interest is
in excess of the rate allowed in the state where the contract is made, if the parties,
without intending to evade the usury laws of that state, contract with reference to
the law of the state where the debtor resides.
It is not essential to the validity of such contract as to the interest, that the note
should be made payable, in express terms, in the state where the maker resides. To
ascertain whether the parties intended, in good faith, to contract with reference to
the laws of such state, all the circumstances surrounding the transaction will be
examined.
ERROR to the District Court of Hamilton county.

John Perlee sued the plaintiffs in error upon the promissory note
of which the following is a copy :
FAIRBURY, Ill., Jan. 1st 1871.
"$1000.
One year after date, we promise to pay to the order of John Perlee $1000, at ten per cent., from date.
ANDREW J. SCOTT,
HENDERSON WT. SCOTT,
Security."
Due Jan. 1st 1872.

The interest was paid for five years at the stipulated rate; and
$700 was paid on the principal.
The petition claimed a balance due of $300, with ten per cent.
interest, from January 1st 1876, and interest at six per cent. on
I .
two instalments of interest past due.
The defence was that the contract was made in Ohio; that $235
of said interest was usurious by the laws of Ohio, and that the
usury should be credited upon the principal. The plaintiff replied
that the contract was made in Illinois and the stipulated rate was
legal by the laws of that state. The evidence as to the place of
the contract was as follows:
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The defendant, Andrew J. Scott, testified as follows :
"I obtained the loan from the plaintiff through my brother, my
security, residing in Ohio ; he and Perlee lived- in Ohio; I lived'
in Illinois; I sent the note to my brother, my security on it; my
brother then signed the note here in Ohio, and handed it to the
plaintiff; I made the payments of interest myself; I sent the interest to plaintiff in Ohio; I paid him twice by draft; the loan was
procured by Henderson W. Scott in Ohio."
Upon cross-examination, witness said: "The payments were all
made here to plaintiff; I moved here in January 1872; * * *
the contract for the loan was not made in Illinois; I wrote to my
brother here to procure the loan ; the matter was not talked over
in 1870, in Illinois, about the loan; Perlee and I are brothers-inlaw; * * * I did not obligate my surety to sign this note when
plaintiff was in Illinois, or arrange for him to become surety,"
which was all the testimony offered by the defendant.
Perlee, in his own behalf, testified: "I and my wife were in
Illinois, in 1870, to see defendant, A. J. Scott; he was building
and wanted money; I said I did not have any; I said I had bonds;
he offered me ten per cent. interest, in summer of 1870 ; I said I
had niy money in bonds; I agreed to loan him the money at ten
per cent. ; Henderson W. Scott to go on note; I was willing to let
him have it on the terms named; this took place at Fairbury, Illinois, while I was visiting A. J. Scott, in the summer of 1870, and
this note was sent without any other or further conversation or
arrangement between, us; I got the note from Henderson W. Scott,
in Ohio, and gave him the money to send to Andrew J. Scott ; the
interest was paid by A. J. Scott, when due, .by draft on New York;
credited $100 on interest, and $700 on the principal."
The case was tried without a jury, and the Court of Common
Pleas gave judgment in favor of Perlee, which judgment was
affirmed by the District Court, whereupon this writ of error was
taken.
Thomas 11.illikin and C. J. Smith, for plaintiff in error.
Alexander Buckingham and A. 0. Jenkins, for defendant in
error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
J.-The findings and judgment of the* court where

DOYLE,

a

SCOTT v. PERLEE.

case is tried without the intervention of a jury, will not be disturbed
by this court unless such findings and judgment are clearly against
the weight of the evidence. In the present case the testimony,
beyond what appears on the face of the note, consists solely of that
given by the two parties, Scott and Perlee. Which of them was
to be believed was a matter properly to be determined by the court
trying the case, and if the judgment can fairly be sustained upon
the testimony of either, it ought not to be reversed: Landis v.
Kelly, 27 Ohio St. 571.
The court might well find from the testimony, if the plaintiff
was believed, that in the summer of 1870, the plaintiff was in
Fairbury, Illinois, where the defendant, Andrew J. Scott, resided;
that the latter desiring money to carry on some building enterprises
in which he was engaged, in Illinois, applied to the plaintiff, who
was his brother-in-law and visiting him at the time, for a loan,
agreeing to pay him therefor ten per cent. interest; that the
plaintiff agreed to make the loan upon the terms named, upon the
defendant's note with Henderson W. Scott, who lived in Ohio, as
surety, and without any further arrangement Scott wrote the note
at Fairbury, at which place he dated and signed it; that it was
then sent to Ohio to the surety who signed it and delivered it to thepayee, receiving the money in this state and forwarding it to the
principal, and that the parties intended in good faith, to contract
with reference to the law of Illinois, as to the rate of interest to
be paid for the use of the money.
The question is presented for our consideration, whether such a
contract, thus made, is usurious ? That this contract was executed
in Ohio may be conceded; although signed in Illinois by the principal debtor and there dated, it was delivered in Ohio and was not
a completed contract until delivery.
The fact that the loan was negotiated in Illinois, in accordance
with the written terms of the note, is not insignificant, however,
in determining the intention of the parties to contract with reference
to Illinois law: Findley v. Hall, 12 Ohio St. 612.
It is then the case of a citizen of Illinois, executing his note
in Ohio, in pursuance of an arrangement previously made in
Illinois, for money borrowed to be used in the latter state, with an
agreement to pay interest according to her laws, not intending or
attempting thereby to evade our usury laws, but in good faith. Is
such a contract tainted with usury ?
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Since the cases of .Findleyv. Hall, 12 Ohio St. 610, and Kilgore
v. Dempsey, 25 Id. 413, it is undoubtedly the law of this state,
and indeed it is now well established almost universally that when
a contract is entered into in one state to be performed in another,
between citizens of each, and the rate of interest is different in the
two, the parties may, in good faith, stipulate for the rate of either,
and thus expressly determine with reference to the law of which
place that part of the contract shall be decided. When such a
contract, in 'express terms provides for a rate of interest lawful in
one but unlawful in the other state, the parties will be presumed to
contract with reference to the laws of the state where the stipulated
rate is lawful, and such presumption will prevail until overcome by
proof that the stipulation was a shift to impart validity to a contract for a rate of interest in fact usurious: Fisher v. Otis, 3
Chandler 83; Butters v. Olds, 11 Iowa 1; Arnold v. Potter,
22 Id. 198; Newman v. Kershaw, 10 Wis. 340; Hosford v.
Nichols, 1 Paige Ch. 225; Townsend v. Biley, 46 N. H. 300;
.Depaw v. Hfumphreys, 20 Martin (La.) 1; Fanning v. Consequa,
17 Johns. 511; Pratt v. Adams, 7 Paige 615; Chapman v.
Robertson, 6 Id. 627; Bichards v. Globe Bank, 12 Wis. 696.
If the parties to the note in question had expressly stipulated
in the note, that it'was payable in Illinois, the contract to pay ten
per cent. interest would be perfectly valid, although the note was
executed in Ohio. Is it rendered invalid by reason of the omission to make that express stipulation ? It is not entirely settled,
by the authorities, where this note, as a matter of interpretation, is
payable, there being no place expressly stipulated, but the weight
of authority and the sounder reason, I think, sustain the proposition, that when a note is dated and signed at the place of residence
of the debtor, and contains stipulations, lawful under the laws
of such place, but forbidden by the law of the residence of the
creditor, or where the note was completed by delivery, and no other
place of payaent is named, it will be presumed that the parties
intended the note to be payable at the former place, assuming of
course that no attempted evasion of the usury law of the latter is
proved. In other words, in the absence of any proof, the presumption of law is that the note in question is an Illinois contract,
and is valid both as to principal and interest.
To overcome this presumption the actual ficts may be shown.
It is shown that the contract was delivered in Ohio, but taken in
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connection with the other facts proved, that does not overcome the
presumption that it is payable in Illinois, where the debtor resided
when. he dated and signed his contract and where alone it is legal
according to all of its terms: 2 Parsons on Contracts 584 and cases
cited; Daniels on Neg. Inst., sect. 90; Arnold v. Potter, 22 Iowa
198; Tillotson v. Tillotson, 34 Conn. 336; Jewell v. Wright, 30
N. Y. 264. Where such express stipulation would uphold the
contract, if the same thing can fairly be inferred from what is
stipulated, it will likewise be upheld. But, while I believe that
this contract can be thus sustained, it is not necessary to place the
decision upon that ground.
There is no reason why a citizen of Illinois, or any other state,
may not come into Ohio and borrow money to be used in the state
of his residence, and in good faith contract with reference to the
laws of the latter state, independently of where his note is executed
or where it is legally presumed to be payable. In such case the
only question is one of good faith. Did he honestly contract with
reference to the law of his allegiance-the law of the state where
he lives?
In Arnold v. Potter, 22 Iowa 194, the note was made by a citizen of Iowa in Massachusetts, payable in New York, and the court
instructed the jury that "if defendant went to Boston and urged
the loan, and promised ten per cent. under the laws of Iowa, and
all the arrangements and contracts were made as to the laws of
Iowa, in good faith, then the defence fails, and plaintiff can recover.
If the parties in good faith loaned and borrowed the money sued
for, with jthe full understanding that the law of Iowa was to govern
as to the interest, then the laws of New York and Massachusetts
can have no influence, but the understanding of the parties must
prevail." The Supreme Court, in affirming this charge, say : "1The
form of the transaction is nothing, the cardinal inquiry being, when
the contract specifying the amount reserved is express, did the parties resort to it as a means of disguising the usury in violation of
the laws of the state where the contract was made or to be executed,
and in arriving at this intention all of the facts are to be taken into
consideration."
It is true that in this case, like Chapman v. Bobertson, supra,
security was given by mortgage upon lands in the state of the
debtor's residence, but the fact that security is given for a note does
not alter the terms of the note. But such fact has significance in
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determining what the intention of the parties was, as to the laws
of which state their contract had reference, or by which it was to
be construed: Newman v. Kershaw, 10 Wis. 341; Fisher v. Otis,
3 Chandler 83; Hosford v. lViehols, 1 Paige Oh. 225; 2 Kent's
Cor. (12 ed.) 460. It is a fact of no greater significance than is
found in this case, where the borrower actually negotiated for the
loan in the state of his residence, dated his note there and stipulated for interest allowed by her laws: see iosford v. Niehols,
supra, I Paige 225.
In a recent case, KYellog v. Miller, 18 Fed. Rep. 198, decided
by MOaRARY, C. J., in the Circuit Court of Nebraska, he held,
upon a state of facts very like those recited in this case, except
that there was a mortgage security, that the contract was valid
upon both grounds assumed in this opinion ; first, because the contract was to be performed in Nebraska, and second, on the ground
we are now considering. "1A citizen of one state may loan money
to a citizen of another state, and contract for the rate of interest
allowed by the laws of the latter state, although the legal rate of
interest allowed is greater in such state than in the state where the
contract is made, and in which it is to be performed." See also
Tilden v. Blair, 21 Wall. 241, and the comments thereon of
FOLGE , J., in Dickinson v. -Edwards, 77 N. Y. 580, that the
ruling consideration of that case was the intention of the parties,
that the draft should be used in Illinois, as a contract of that state,
although accepted and payable in New York: Wayne County'
Savings Bank v. Low, 6 Abbott's New Cases, 76, 95, affirmed in
81 N. Y. 569 ; 2 Kent's Com., 12 ed., bottom paging 622 to
Mliet v. Camp 13 Wis. 208. Indeed these cases
625, and note;
are but applications of the rule as given by Lord MANSFIELD :
"1The law of the place can never be the rule, where the transsaction is entered into with an express view to the law of another
country, as the rule by which it is to be governed:" Robinson v.
Bland 2 Burr. 1078.
" The place of making the contract is not to be so exclusively
regarded, but that when the contracting parties had reference to
another place, that may be regarded. That is, the intention of the
parties shall govern when it is made manifest:" Fisher v. Otis,
supra. That the parties here entered into this contract in good
faith with reference to the laws of Illinois, there can be no doubt.
The law of Ohio never entered into the transaction so far as the

